I increasingly question the hybrid sacred-secular conception of “marriage” in the United States.
Is marriage a sacred institution? Then why should the state be required to ratify it? Faith fellowships of any stripe should be free to marry individuals in a manner consistent with their understanding of the sacred. This is the freedom of faith and conscience embraced by the early Brethren, an unfettered freedom of discernment for faith communities.
Is marriage a legal relationship entered into voluntarily by citizens? Then why should church people object to the extension of equal rights to all? If marriage is a civil status, then justice compels us to reject anything short of its universal application. The days of justifying slavery, denying women the vote, denying employment to persons with disabilities, and other class-based conceptions of civic life are long past.
The mixing of the two — marriage as legal status and sacred ordinance — is like mixing oil and water. We wind up attempting to impose our own conception of the sacred upon others in the public sphere. Like the Volstead Act’s vision of a dry America, and conscription laws with no provision for conscientious objection, this is a bad idea. If marriage is really sacred, then our Brethren heritage calls us to grant others the same freedom of conscience that we sought for ourselves when our understanding of “Christ-like” departed from the cultural norm. Whether we do so within our own faith fellowship is an open question, but we should always grant others the right to conscientiously practice their faith within their fellowship. (Being in communion with someone is different than respecting their freedom of conscience.)
I’m inclined to think that “legally married” is a bad idea. Let’s have “domestic partnerships” or “civil unions” for all in the legal sphere so that civil rights may be universally applied. Then “marriage” (who marries whom and under what circumstances) will be a matter for religious communities to decide. Or let’s acknowledge that in this society “marriage” is a legal rather than a sacred designation and therefore cannot be circumscribed by one group’s understanding of the sacred.
As a heterosexual in a covenant relationship, I resent the fact that the state’s blessing is required to formalize my marriage. I also resent the fact that the state selectively grants this blessing to a favored class of citizens while denying others. That isn’t the kind of religious freedom that the Brethren and others sought in the Americas. It seems as un-American to me as segregated schools and swimming pools.
Nice blog, Carl. Several of us who do theology and political philosophy informed by an Anabaptist, Free Church or Believers Church heritage would agree with your position.
We might want to nuance your statement that marriage is “sacred” because these Anabaptist informed theologies have rejected the claim that marriage is a sacrament or sacerdotal. For this reason we who preach in this tradition cannot officially co-officiate with priests who insist the rite and ritual is a sacrament. Further, non-sacramental traditions can therefore have a more gracious and generous response to divorce because nothing magically sacerdotal happens in the marriage ceremony: it becomes instead a public, external symbol of interior love, commitment and embodied spiritual reality.
Scott, I think we’d see eye to eye on my use of “sacred,” which is Durkheimian rather than sacramental. I write as a sociologist rather than a theologian.
Agreed. Late modern and postmodern Anabaptist theologians, attentive to the embodied spirit of the heritage, would contend that the theological reality is always grounded in the sociological reality.
As a licensed minister in the CoB, my first “wedding gig” last year was a totally non-church wedding. And as a neo-Anabaptist theologian-in-training I’ve grappled with this issue in the ways you’re naming, Carl. I tend to agree that on a societal level, the word “marriage” is void of substantive theological meaning and attempts to “restore the sanctity of marriage” through the (secular) state are totally off-base. (Hunter’s book might be instructive here, no?)
I do, however, find the sacred/secular categories problematic. Folks like William Cavanaugh (Catholic political theologian) have done wonders to show how the secular order is no less “religious” than any given religious tradition. For Pietist-influenced folks such as ourselves, I think this means we need to get past our “non-sacramental” hobby horse because I think it’s outdated.
The same could be said for the allergic reaction Carl seems to have for speaking theologically. (Unless he was being sarcastic with the use of the emoticon.) John Milbank recently said something interesting about theology’s increasingly prominent role in intellectual discourse and the social science’s allergy to it: “I argued that secular social science is traceable back to bad theology, or to reactions against it…” and “The modern idea that philosophy is not about becoming a better person, but is just an objective gaze on reality, is ironically the result of a kind of (bad) theology” (article). Charles Taylor also makes for some instructive learning on this topic.
So perhaps a re-enchantement of intellectual discourse (not to mention worship practices!) is in order, and one that is more trans-disciplinary, lest we continue to be hamstrung by these dichotomous categories, or as Josh Brockway has diagnosed it: a bad case of Modernity.
(I’m totally aware that I’m the young whippersnapper charging in here telling my elders what for. So please forgive my audacity.)
Brian, your young and smart reflections are very welcome. After all, addressing old and dusty intellectual traditions, Emerson declared, “The coming only is sacred.”
I would say that for Cavanaugh, the Catholic, and for Milbank, the Radical Orthodox/Anglican, there is a longing to see the social-political order as religious (which, of course it is sociologically) as well as theologically “sacramental” (which can invite righteous violence). Some of us would want to resist this longing to baptize the social order. I would direct your attention to Walter Klaassen’s little modern classic if you don’t know it, “Anabaptism: Neither Catholic nor Prostestant.” He makes a convincing case that many of the early Anabaptists rejected a sacramentalism (and a traditional metaphysics) not only in society but also in the church, rejecting the idea that there are sacred times, places, people, days or things. In this reading of both sociology and theology, a radical Anabaptist and a Derridian philosopher (one influenced by Jacques Derrida) can agree, “Metaphysics is violence!”
Durkheim’s sacred versus profane distinction applies equally within the realms of what you are calling the sacred and the secular, Brian. It is not a dichotomy between sacred and secular — rather, a distinction between the enchanted or awe-inducing versus the mundane in all arenas of life. Durkheim (and other anthropologists of his era) were making this point a century ago.
Regarding Milbank, one could as readily say that secular social science is traceable to a desire for transcendence, for bridging the truths of particular traditions, describing realities that are not confined to one or the other of them. Taylor, I think, had something of the same project, even as he sought to escape naive conceptions of objectivity and moral neutrality. Finally, I find Brockway’s description of modernity to be somewhat simplistic. The provision of space for all religious traditions within the public politic hardly equates with the relegation of religion to private belief. The American Jewish and Amish experiences attest to that. One could as easily argue that Jefferson’s disestablishment saved religion in America from the fate of the Catholic and established Protestant churches in Europe. Neo-Anabaptist thinkers should recognize the debt they owe to Jefferson/Locke rather than seeing them as the architects of “bad modernity.”
I am not allergic to speaking theologically, Brian — I even indulge that temptation from time to time — but do not see it as my primary role in Brethren scholarly discourse.
Thanks Brian for the shout-out. I am taken aback to see my name thrown about with the likes of Holland, Bowman, Millbank and Taylor…..humbling, even if but a bit simplistic
Carl, I would simply say that my post which Brian highlights is by no means a referred article nor an attempt to present a nuanced argument. Rather, in that short blog post (which is long by many Blog standards) I tried to highlight some of what you are working at here, especially in the case of belief. Hence, the modern project in the North American context has assumed that belief is private and the public politic is the meeting place of a bunch of different “private” spheres. This kind of private/public schematic is rather foreign to some Islamic contexts wherein the public sphere is the religious. So here again, my diagnosis is simplistic not just because of its genre, but because of its geographic and cultural limits.
Though we dismiss the works of Millbank and Cavanagh as overly Constantinian, they do name well the transcendent/metaphysical nature of all “sciences”- political and social. (There is also an element of a Yoderian Anabaptism in their work, though I think Scott’s reference to Klaassen’s work hides the catholic vision of some elements of Anabaptism.) I can walk with Scott so long down the radical deconstruction route, but at some point there is a metaphysic in the religious realm. Is not the nature of the theologian, pastor, Christian lay person to name and realize the Otherness of God? The difference here is that I am saying one comes to a place in any discourse, whether academic or prayerful, where one is faced with claiming a metaphysical narrative (or at least vocabulary). Hence why I think Believer’s Baptism is essential in the Post-Culture we find ourselves in. In essence the person must choose the metaphysic narrative- adopt it, if you will.
That brings me to this fascinating conversation about sacred/sacerdotal/sacramental. Some of this is a need to define terms, which is needed. i have said on occasion (on my blog even) that our current rejection of sacraments is misplaced. If the criticism is of Clericalism (or Classic Hierarchy) I am in. But, I think the rejection of sacraments on traditional terms leaves us without 1) a sense of practice which reveals the incarnational mystery of all creation (and redemption) and 2) leaves us groundless on our “we are the hands and feet of Jesus” theology of service and reconciliation.
Josh
Josh, thanks for this elaboration / clarification.
Regarding the “modern project,” I still think your use of the word “private” overstates the case. If by private you mean anything not broadly shared within the public politic, I accept your point, but if private refers only to “individual” belief, the case is overstated.
The rejection of “metaphysics” in contemporary philosophy is not the same as rejecting transcendence (there can be transcendence without metaphysics), spirituality, mystery, grace and God.
Whether in Caputo’s postmodernism or in Rorty’s pragmatism, or in Yoder’s Anabaptism, or in much other philosophical and theological writing, this is a rejection of classical metaphysics which is much like Lyotard’s critique of the “master-narrative.” There is a fall of the old master story or comprehensive theology wherein, in church and society, all must find their assigned place in the story’s plot. This old dream of offering our world of plurality and ambiguity one comprehensive account of truth or God’s-eye-view has been dreamed out. This is good, some of us believe, for the peace of the city.
After metaphysics, we have a theology and philosophy which must address a multitude of small, contingent, contextual and even competing narratives. Thus, in seeking how to live together in peace, we have narrative theology, comparative theology, constructive theology, poetics and the important discipline of sociology.
This is stimulating discussion, guys, thanks. I would just clarify that though Cavanaugh is Roman Catholic, he’s quite clear in a number of his writings to caution against constantinian thinking, much less practical approaches. This no doubt has to do with his training under Hauerwas, but his experience in Pinochet’s Chile and how the R.C. church did (rather didn’t) respond has a lot to do with his project as well.
It’s also worth noting that debunking “religious violence” is literally the entire point of one of his most recent books, The Myth of Religious Violence: Secular Ideology and the Roots of Modern Conflict. It’s a rigorous work of historical and theological politics which I highly recommend. I’ve read it about 1.5 times and will likely be referring back to it for years to come.
As Josh said, “at some point there is a metaphysic in the religious realm,” I would then point to philosopher Carl Schmitt (another Catholic, oh no!!) who argues that there is a “metaphysical kernel” to all politics, whether religious, secular, or otherwise. I think he’s right, even for the early-pomo “no more grand narratives” narrative that Scott references. Like Josh, I can go down that road so far (good Gen-X’er that I am) but at some point you’ll have to be clear and honest about the universalizing narration you’re doing in a body politic.
I do need to work with Cavenaugh’s violence book. In the many reviews I’ve read he seems desperate, according to his interpreters, to make the case that it is not religion that provokes violence but economics, politics, culture and other social strife. Yes, often it is, but religion in its metaphysical temptations is also dripping with violence.
Schmitt, the good fascist, is of course sociologically correct that there is, or at least was in his era, a metaphysical kernel in all politics. But is this a good thing or something to carefully analyze, deconstruct and move beyond? It was the “metaphysical kernel” in the Third Reich that made it existentially and socially easier for Schmitt’s countrymen and church to embrace the universalizing theology and politics of the master-race, that ugly, murderous master-narrative.
A further thought, and perhaps a clarification, in response to your post, Brian. I do like your call for re-enchantment. However, for some of us there is nothing enchanting about metaphysics. The irony of life must be supplemented by romance, eros, mystery, art and adventure. This can lead us into a spirituality which celebrates the contingent, contextual and particular passions of our life-stories which can indeed invite transcendence and enchantment. Yet here I am likely closer to Carl and his sociologists on the sacred than I am to the Catholic metaphysians. When many of us doing modern and postmodern theology suggest that theology is more of a poetics than a metaphysics, we are calling for a movement from magic to metaphor in our understanding of God, world, self and other.
So I am wondering how we are to define Metaphysic. Scott, what I hear you saying is a kind of Ontology ascribed to metaphysics. It makes me think of Moltmann’s discussion of Perichoesis and the Filoque clause. Here he says that in the West the “And from the Son” addition to the creed has created a metaphysical claim for hierarchy- ie that the Spirit is subsumed under the Christ in the Trinity, therefore the parishioner should be subject to the Bishop. (that is a VERY rough paraphrase to a pretty nuanced argument). Rather, he says, the internal self-giving (Perichoresis) of the Trinity (Creator to Son to Spirit) is a much more helpful metaphyscial claim- ie that it reveals how order can come about within human communities- that is in a kenotic, or self-giving love, as we we seen the Christ hymn of Philippians 2.
I know that I (and probably Brian to some degree) have been equating Metaphysics with transcendence- which you clarified earlier. Yet, I still think there is a hint of the Master- Narrative within the “theopoetic” and contextual argument you are naming. Here, like Moltmoann’s Kenotic Love, there is still a claim about a deep structure within the cosmos and in God’s Self that guides what “ought to be” in the Church and the World.
Basically, I fail to see how the Post-Structural and Deconstruction schools of theology avoid the problem they set out to correct. it feels as though they are simply changing the Metaphysical terms to support a new set of Ethics.
Right, Josh, I’m suggesting, in concert with a long philosophical tradition, that transcendence, spirituality, mystery, grace and God need not be equated with a comprehensive system, a master-narrative, if you will. This can vex the surplus of meaning in the story, the poem, the prayer, the ritual by reducing their meaning and message to some grand systematic truth.
There is a common misunderstanding that meta-physics means that which is above physics, that which transcends mundane physical existence. However, in academic philosophical parlor, it is not this popular definition at all but rather, in definition, a strong sense of the META, a comprehensive, master account of the meaning and message of all existence.
I’ll look at Moltmann. I haven’t thought much about him since I bumped into him in New Orleans French Quarter a few years ago. We were both in Faulkner House Books. He was looking at the religion section and I was pricing with the bookseller a first edition of Brother Tennessee’s “A Streetcar Named Desire.” Moltmann found this interest curious. Ah, theologians!
At some point and in some text Moltmann, citing J.B. Metz, suggests that the only universal utterance in the universe is the cry of suffering and that when the Crucified God moaned in agony, it harmonized with the cry of creation. For some of us, this is better poetry than metaphysics because, following Brother Tennessee, we must ask, “But what about the human blissful cry of desire?”
Society needs a means to recognize a legal relationship between two individuals. It
is called marriage. ( In a number of countries a man may have a number of wives
to whom he is “Married”) Whether or not the individuals find joy, happiness and
idenity with one another is the goal of the relationship of many marriages, but certainly not all of them. We could change the name from ‘marriage’ to another
name with the same legal standing for homosexual persons as long as the name
gives the same ‘rights’ for the relationship legally. Our society is having an increasing number of persons ‘living together, having children ( families) without any legal
marriage. ( Child support and responsibility being legally defined in most cases.)
Gerald
What is the point of using a name other than “marriage” with the same legal standing for gay couples, Gerald, if in every practical respect it is identical to marriage? And how would we defend the “separate but equal” designations legally and constitutionally?
Would it be better for my marriage to be considered a “civil union” — for legal purposes — in the eyes of the state, but also a marriage — with no legal ramifications — in the eyes of the church? Just wondering where you would come out on this.
I merely used the option of another name for the gay group as
a “crude” example ( like black and white, old and young etc)
but I would not recommend it. I believe that if you are
legally married (civil union) with it registered in the count house records, then you could call it by any name as long as the legal meaning persisted. The church has a way to go in
deciding what to do about “marriage” (divorce & remarriage);
living separately from one another; living with someone
to whom no legal attachment has been secured ‘married to
someone else’ ; children resulting; etc. These questions seem to be of minor importance, somewhat like birth control and sexual information is rarely taught in the church! Gerald
I re-read this post last night. Despite the exchanges, I really think you are naming a central question for the Church- both at large and for the Church of the Brethren.
It really hit home for me when I was asked to officiate a wedding in Ohio. When I did my research, I realized I needed to register with the state to sign the license. I went through all the steps and received a serial number and I realized I was now working for the state. I was signing a legal document as a legal representative of the state….not the Church. My signing the license had nothing to do with the covenant, but was an act of civil magistrate. Needless to say I was a bit taken a back.
All of that is to say that this applies across the board- not just in terms of covenants or marriages for same sex couples. Should it not get our Brethren dander up that all of our weddings are in effect civil contracts with a nice Christian layer over the top?
Josh